across plants. We further correlate growth across industry-years to policy reforms such as de-licensing, trade and FDI liberalization, and removal of small-scale industry reservations.
We find evidence of a sizable speedup (over 5 percent per year) in aggregate productivity growth beginning around the early 1990s. The pickup arises from changes within plants over time, not reallocation from low to high productivity incumbents.
Across industry-years, we are unable to relate much of the growth to reforms such as de-licensing, trade and FDI liberalization, or lifting of small-scale industry reservations. Even taking the high end of our estimates, which are similar to previous studies, these observable reforms account for less than half of manufacturing productivity growth in India from 1980-2007, and essentially none of the speedup. Other studies find important effects, to be sure, but do not account for most of the growth (or growth pickup) we see. 1 A manufacturing miracle has occurred in India, but of mysterious origin.
This echoes the qualitative conclusion of a recent book by Bardhan (2010) . Our findings (or lack thereof) must be taken with even more caution than usual. The time series is not long, and the annual growth rates are distressingly noisy. Our metrics for policy are imperfect, as is the methodology for measuring productivity growth. The effects of policy might not show up in industry productivity growth immediately following the reforms or at all. Finally, we are only analyzing large, formal manufacturing plants-to the exclusion of most workers in manufacturing and other sectors (services, agriculture).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define our measure of productivity growth. Section 3 provides an overview of the Indian economy and details about the data. Section 4 shows the estimates of productivity growth using plant-level data. In Section 5 we provide details about the reforms that took place in India in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as evidence about the effects of these reforms on industry and aggregate productivity. Section 6 concludes. Basu et al. (2009) show that, under certain conditions, a key contributor to welfare is the present and future behavior of aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). With this motivation, we try to estimate TFP growth rates in Indian manufacturing. We also decompose the growth into increased efficiency of individual plants vs. growth due to reallocation of resources across economic units, following Basu and Fernald (2002) , Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) , Petrin et al. (2011) , and others.
Growth accounting methodology
Aggregate TFP growth is aggregate value added growth less aggregate input growth (both deflated). It can be decomposed into growth from plant efficiency, reallocation of inputs across plants within sectors, reallocation of inputs between sectors, and returns to scale. For clarity of exposition, consider the case of one good (Y with price P Y ) and one input ( X with price P X ). In this special case, aggregate TFP growth in Basu and Fernald (2002 
The first term is a value added weighted average of plant efficiency growth rates. This first term should capture increasing returns to scale, technological change and improvements in labor quality. We can split the second term into growth tied to aggregate profits and growth due to reallocation, respectively:
The middle term in Eq.
(1) reflects that input growth is "worth" more socially than it costs privately in the presence of economic profits. As described by Basu and Fernald (2002) , the economic profit rate for plant i is equal to 1 −
, where γ i is the degree of returns to scale and μ i is the markup of price over marginal cost. Thus positive economic profits reflect even bigger markups than returns to scale. 
where x j = i∈ j x j . The first term in Eq. (3) is reallocation of inputs across plants within a sector while the second term is reallocation of inputs across sectors.
Having described the general way in which we calculate aggregate TFP growth and its components, we now provide a few details about our implementation. First, as we will describe below, in the ASI entry and exit are conflated with unmatched continuing plants. If we aggregate "entrants" and "exiters", the resulting changes due to net entry are extremely noisy. We therefore focus only on incumbent plants in each period.
Second, to avoid double-counting of output and understatement of aggregate manufacturing TFP growth, we work with value added rather than gross output. Nominal value added of plant i is P Third, we have 2-digit gross output price deflators, which we use to deflate gross output and construct materials deflators at the 2-digit industry level. We use an economy-wide deflator for capital, and the number of employees for labor (white collar and blue collar, respectively).
Fourth, we follow Basu and Fernald (1997) in calculating Divisia real value added growth as
where β M st is the share of materials expenditure in nominal output for the sector-year.
2
Finally, we calculate plant efficiency growth as
where α k st are sector-year input cost shares, assuming a 15% rental price of capital. 3 There are three inputs: fixed assets, skilled labor and unskilled labor. We calculate all growth rates as 100 times the log difference, and all weights as Tornquist shares: 0.5 × (w t + w t−1 ). See Appendix A for more details.
Indian manufacturing data

Backdrop of the Indian economy
Prior to the global financial crisis, the Indian economy overall was growing at nearly double digit rates. The transition from the "Hindu" rate of 3% per annum to 9.7% in 2007 has been widely studied and publicized. Fig. 1 shows the evolution 2 We exclude shares outside the unit interval when calculating the average. As a robustness check, we also calculated Divisia value added using total input costs (materials, fuels, capital and labor) instead of nominal output in the denominator of β M st . This has the effect of dramatically increasing the observed productivity growth speedup. 3 We test the robustness of our productivity estimates to lower (10%) and higher (20%) rental rates of capital and find no significant differences. These results are available in an Online Appendix.
Fig. 1.
Sectoral distribution and productivity in the Indian economy. Hnatskovska and Lahiri (2011) calculations from National Sample Surveys, which include both formal and informal activity in each sector.
of manufacturing, services, and agriculture amidst India's growth transition. The growth transition has been accompanied by rising fractions of employment and value added in the services sector (Panels A and B). The mirror image is the contraction of the agricultural sector. Manufacturing has maintained a surprisingly steady share of employment (∼13%) and value added (∼20%). Meanwhile, manufacturing and services have been the main drivers of labor productivity growth (Panel C). Similar trends are observed in total factor productivity growth across sectors. Thus, manufacturing has been an important driver of overall productivity growth, though services have played the dominant role. All three panels of Fig. 1 are based on estimates of formal plus informal employment and value added in each sector. As our data analysis will focus on the formal manufacturing sector, it is important to get a sense of the relative size of formal manufacturing relative to informal manufacturing. Fig. 2 shows that formal manufacturing accounted for 56% of GDP generated in manufacturing in the early 1980s, and that this share has steadily risen over time. By the end our sample in 2007, formal plants account for 68% of manufacturing GDP. Though most manufacturing output is in the formal sector, most manufacturing employment appears to be in the informal sector-around 80% according to Hsieh and Klenow (2012) . In contrast to the falling share of informal output, they report a slightly rising share of informal employment, from 79% in 1989 to 80.5% in 2005.
Plant-level data: annual survey of industries
The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), which is conducted by the Indian Ministry of Statistics, is the only annual survey of Indian manufacturing plants. We use the plant-level micro data from 1980-1981 to 2007-2008 (with the exception of the 1995-1997 surveys, which are missing or inconsistent). Despite its coverage, and growing use by economic researchers, there are substantial caveats. We outline these here-for further details, see Appendix A.
The ASI sampling frame consists of all registered factories employing 10 or more workers using power, or 20 or more workers without using power. The largest plants, which we call the "Census sample", are surveyed every year. The size threshold for the Census sample varied over this period between 50 and 200 workers (see Table A .1), but all plants employing 200 or more workers are always surveyed. The remaining plants are sampled randomly, and we always weight by the inverse of the sampling probabilities.
Plants report data on the value of output, materials and fuels, although from 1996-1997 onwards up to one-third of these observations are missing. Capital is measured by the book value of fixed assets, and employment and wages are divided between blue collar workers and all other employees. We construct a common industry concordance for the NIC1970, NIC1987, NIC1998 and NIC2004 coding schemes, which gives just under 100 roughly 3-digit industries with a common definition over the entire period. We focus on plants in these industries who report these basic variables. There are substantial numbers of extreme outliers, especially since 1996-1997, and we attempt to reduce their influence by top-coding and bottom-coding the 1% tails ("Winsorizing") for all plant-level variables prior to aggregation. Fig. 3 plots the sizes of the full ASI sample, the Census sample, and the sample of plants employing 200 or more workers over the period. Vertical lines reflect publicly announced changes in the sampling methodology. There are two gaps: the first gap reflects the missing 1995-1996 (no survey was conducted in that year); the second gap reflects the fact that the 1996-1997 survey substantially differs from the 1997-1998 survey, both in the sampling methodology and the survey form. The total value added captured in the 1996-1997 survey is more than a quarter less than that in the 1994-1995 or 1997-1998 surveys, as shown in Table A .2. Because of this, we drop the 1996-1997 survey year from the subsequent analysis; our main results are strengthened if we instead retain it. As explained, we are interested in decomposing productivity growth into that occurring within plants versus across plants. The publicly available ASI micro data contains no plant identifiers until 1998, but by comparing plant records in adjacent years in the Census sample, we are able to construct an imperfect panel. Our algorithm searches for unique matches 1980-1994 and 1997-2007. between records on static variables such as location, and for "close" matches between year-end and year-start balancesheet variables, such as opening and closing values of fixed assets. (See Appendix A for details about the plant matching algorithm.) Table 1 presents a few statistics about three samples: all plants, Census plants and plants with 200 or more workers, respectively. The Census sample contains the largest number of linked-up plants, but Fig. 3 shows that its size jumps around disconcertingly over time. By contrast, the L 200 sample reflects only the largest plants, which are always surveyed. The average ASI plant employs 89 people, whereas plants in the Census and L 200 samples are much larger (employing 294 and 814 on average). We are able to successfully match 79% of annual records in the Census sample to previous-year records, and this rate rises to 89% for the largest plants. The remaining records represent plants that either entered or exited the Census sample, or were not matched due to measurement error. The final row shows that, once the plant match rate is taken into account, we are left with about 10,404 annual plant growth rate observations in the Census sample, and 3649 annual plant growth rate observations in the L 200 sample. Fig. 1 provided preliminary evidence of rising levels and growth rates of labor productivity in Indian manufacturing (formal and informal), particularly from the early 1990s onwards. These trends are also visible when we focus on formal manufacturing. Using manufacturing totals from ASI plant-level data and economy-wide totals from the World Development Indicators, Fig. 4 plots manufacturing's share of economy-wide value added (GDP) and employment. Over the entire 1980-2007 sample, ASI manufacturing rose from about 13.5% to 17% of GDP. At the same time, ASI employment fell from 2.4% to 2.0%. Clearly, labor productivity growth in the ASI exceeded that in the rest of the economy. Moreover, the level of labor productivity is dramatically higher in ASI manufacturing than the rest of the economy. Fig. 1 above showed that manufacturing overall was a higher share of output than of employment, with labor productivity being twice as high in manufacturing as in agriculture. Implicit in Fig. 4 is that labor productivity is much higher in formal manufacturing than in informal manufacturing. See Hsieh and Klenow (2012) for direct evidence to this effect. 
Productivity growth: trends and decomposition
Estimated growth
With the ASI samples in hand, we now proceed to growth accounting exercises. The aggregate TFP growth outlined in Section 2 involves averaging plant-level growth rates of value added and inputs. But a common way to calculate aggregate TFP growth is to sum levels of value added and inputs across plants and then calculate growth rates from these aggregates. For robustness and comparability to other studies, we start with the growth rates of aggregates. Table 2 reports annual rates of growth for aggregate gross output, value added and factor inputs in Indian manufacturing for the period 1980-2007. The three columns cover different samples: all plants in column 1 (including smaller sampled plants), the panel of Census plants in column 2 (those sampled with probability 1), and the panel of plants that employ 200 or more workers in column 3 (a subset of the Census panel plants). As mentioned in Section 3 and illustrated in Fig. 3 , the L 200 sub-sample is likely to be more reliable since these plants are always surveyed irrespective of changes in sampling methodology. Across the three samples, value added growth ranges from 9.4% to 10.8%, input growth ranges from 3.9% to 5.1%, and TFP growth ranges from 5.4% to 5.9%. TFP growth is modestly faster for the bigger plants, suggesting they contribute disproportionately to overall growth.
In Table 3 we look at the growth of aggregates in Indian manufacturing across two sub-periods: 1980-1992 and 1993-2007. 4 The table reports a substantial increase in the rate of growth of TFP across the two sub-periods. Using all ASI plants, the growth rate of TFP rose from 3.5% to 7.4% from 1980-1992 to 1993-2007 (columns 1 and 4) . A sizable pickup of around 3 percentage points is also visible in Census plants (from 4.3% to 7.3%) and in the L 200 plants (from 4.3% to 7.5%). 4 We choose the year 1992-1993 as the break year for two reasons. First, in the context of the industrial and trade policy reforms that took place in 1991
(following a balance of payments crisis), it is interesting to compare the growth of the manufacturing before and after the early 1990s. Second, a dummy variable which switches on in 1992-1993 explains the largest fraction of the growth rate of TFP of any dummies near the midpoint of the sample. Here we regress aggregate productivity growth in year t on ERA Source: ASI-see Appendix A for sample construction details.
Table 5
Averages of plant-level growth rates over two periods (%). Source: ASI-see Appendix A for sample construction details.
Growth within plants vs. reallocation across plants
We now calculate plant-level growth rates of key variables then aggregate them using plant shares in aggregate value added. This allows us to decompose aggregate TFP growth into plant-level efficiency growth, between-and within-sector reallocation, and an aggregate profits term, as described in Section 2 above. Table 4 shows that TFP growth averaged around 6.7% during 1980-2007 among Census plants in the ASI, and 7.1% among L 200 plants. These TFP growth rates are modestly faster than those calculated on growth rates of aggregates (5.8% and 5.9%, respectively). The difference arises not on the output side (average plant output growth actually exceeded the growth of aggregate output), but rather on the input side (plant inputs grew little on average, whereas aggregate input use grew substantially).
The bottom portion of Table 4 reveals that the primary source of TFP growth is growing productivity of individual plants: 4.8% per year for Census plants and 5.3% for L 200 plants. Reallocation of inputs from low to high productivity plants within three-digit industries contributed 1.1% annually among Census plants and 1.0% annually among L 200 plants, whereas reallocation of inputs across three-digit industries contributed just 0.2% per year. Finally, because of very positive economic profits in the aggregate, even modestly growing input contributed 0.6% per year. Table 5 shows that the growth speedup occurs when aggregating plant growth rates, just as when taking growth rates of aggregates. The TFP growth rate jumped from 4.0% to 9.3% for Census plants and from 4.1% to 10.1% for large plants (those with employment greater than or equal to 200) from the mid-1990s onward. Panel A of Fig. 5 illustrates the growth pickup visually. The figure makes it clear that TFP growth is volatile from year to year. This will show up in estimated standard errors shortly.
The bottom half of Table 5 decomposes the growth speedup. Most of the TFP growth speedup is attributable to rising plant-level efficiency (which saw a 4.7 to 5.5 percentage point jump between the sub-periods). Much smaller but significant is the contribution of aggregate profits, which increased from around 0.3 to 0.8% per year. Within-sector reallocation continued at the same pace in the two sub-periods, at about 1.1% per year. This result is surprising given various industrial and trade policy reforms that occurred from the mid-1980s to early-1990s. One might have expected reforms to reallocate factors from less to more productive plants within industries. The reforms may have done so, but evidently did not contribute to a faster rate of TFP growth from within-sector reallocation in the second half of our sample. The table does indicate a slightly quicker pace of gains from between-sector reallocation, from 0.1% to 0.3% per year. But this is small in the context of a roughly 5-6 percentage point growth pickup. It is useful to compare our estimates of TFP growth to other studies of Indian manufacturing and industry. Our estimate of roughly 4% average annual TFP growth from 1980-1992 is higher than the 2.2% of Hulten and Srinivasan (1999) for a similar period. They use published ASI aggregates, but apply a double deflation method whereas we calculate real value added using a Divisia index. Our estimate is closer to the 3.2% of Unel (2003) . For the later period, our TFP growth of 9-10% is much higher than the 4.7% estimated by Unel (2003) . Our later sample of 1993-2007 does not overlap much with the 1991-1997 sample in Unel (2003) , which could be particularly important given some high growth rates in the 2000s. 6 Lastly, Harrison et al. (2011) . Like us, they find relatively little growth from reallocation among existing plants. They estimate much lower TFP growth than we do, however-on the order of 25% rather than 165%. Most of this discrepancy appears to stem from their use of a gross-output based measure without Domar weights.
We now turn to statistical significance of the pickup in TFP growth. We regress the growth rate of TFP on a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for years from 1993 onwards. Table 6 reports the results for the L 200 sub-sample of plants, and Table 7 for all matched Census plants. The 5-6 percentage point increase in annual growth, while large economically, is only marginally significant statistically in the first column of Panel A. The p-values are between 5 and 10% due to standard errors on the order of 3 percentage points. Note we can aggregate TFP growth to the annual level before running these regressions, or instead run regressions at the sectoral or plant level. The coefficients are identical, but the standard errors shrink somewhat, with significance mostly at the 5% level. In each case we cluster by year, in the sectoral case by sector as well, and in the plant case also by plant. Given the sizable standard errors, the most generous interpretation of column 1 in Tables 6 and 7 is that the data show a large but inexact jump in productivity growth starting around the mid-1990s.
In Panel B of Tables 6 and 7 we report the significance of the speedup in plant-level efficiency growth. As the standard errors are a little smaller and the growth pickup a little larger, these are more often significant at the 5% level. Panels C and D of the tables show that gains from reallocation are estimated more precisely; we are more confident there was no uptick in the pace of reallocation.
In columns 2-4 of Tables 6 and 7 we test for a growth speedup after making corrections for heteroscedasticity. While our motivation is to try to obtain more precise estimates of any pickup, these will also serve as robustness checks. We implement three alternative weighting schemes. First, given that plant-level data may be particularly noisy in some years, in column 2 we weight each year by the inverse of the cross-sectional variance of plant growth rates in that year.
7 Second, to mitigate the impact of sector-specific noise, in column 3 of Tables 6 and 7 , we use FGLS techniques to estimate the time series variance of sectoral TFP growth around its sectoral mean, and use the inverse of that to weight each sector-year growth rate observation. 8 In column 4, we weight each observation by the inverse of both plant and sector noise. As shown in columns 2-4 of Tables 6 and 7, correcting for noise gives modestly more precise estimates. The magnitude of our estimate of the productivity speedup bounces around a little, but our basic result continues to hold. That is, there seemed to be a large increase in productivity growth in Indian manufacturing starting in the mid-1990s of around six percentage points. This was typically significant at the 5-10% level, and occurred mainly at the plant level as opposed to via reallocation of inputs across plants.
We mentioned earlier that TFP growth also appeared to pick up around 2002. In an Online Appendix we provide versions of Tables 6 and 7 for the alternative sample break of 1980-2002 vs. 2002-2007 . The speedup beginning in 2002 appears even larger than that in 1993, but is also less precisely estimated given our sample ends in 2007. Still, the pattern is similar whether we look at a 1993 break or a 2002 break: the growth rate of within-plant productivity growth increased sharply, whereas growth from input reallocation did not. , where g it is the growth rate of TFP of plant i andĝ t is the average growth rate of TFP in year t. 8 To apply the GLS technique, we regress the growth rate of TFP on the era dummy variable in an ancillary regression and obtain the corresponding residuals. Then we project the log of the square of those residuals on sector fixed effects as variance predictors. The predicted values from this regression are the variance estimates used to obtain the FGLS estimator. Finally, we re-estimate the pickup equation, but now weighting by the inverse of the variance estimate. Note that we can implement this technique using either plant-level or sectoral data, not annual data. The fact that reallocation within industries did not contribute importantly to either average growth or the speedup is surprising. According to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) , gaps in productivity were large in India from [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] , and in China the narrowing of such gaps from 1998-2005 added around 2 percentage points a year to growth. 9 In India, we find that productivity dispersion within industries did not fall over time as one would expect from diminishing returns combined with input reallocation. Fig. 6 presents the histogram of plant productivities in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2007. 10 These are log levels relative to the industry means. The top graphs are for the Census panel, and the bottom graphs for the L 200 panel.
The kernel density lines are weighted by the value added share of each plant, and the histograms are unweighted. Table 8 presents standard deviations of log productivity, the log difference of productivity at the 75th vs. 25th percentiles, and the log difference at the 90th vs. The rise in productivity dispersion is consistent with our earlier finding that Indian growth did not get a lift from reallocation of inputs from low to high productivity plants. But transitory dispersion in plant productivity is hard to capitalize on given the constraints of information and adjustment costs. So, was the increase in plant productivity dispersion persistent or transitory? Table 8 provides the serial correlation of plant revenue productivity (in logs, relative to the industry mean) in 1980-1981, 1990-1991, 2000-2001, and 2006-2007 . The serial correlation rose from the early years to the later years; productivity differences became more persistent, not more fleeting. Again, this is surprising in that many of the reforms should have reduced persistent differences, leaving more transitory ones. Source: ASI-see Appendix A for sample construction details.
Perhaps the reason we do not see a big role for reallocation is that inputs did not move around across plants, say because of firing restrictions on large formal plants. This does not appear to be the case. Table 9 shows the standard deviation of input growth rates across plants. These growth rates are relative to the industry mean. The S.D. was calculated for each year, then we averaged across the 1980s (1980-1981 through 1989-1990) , the 1990s, and the 2000s. The resulting S.D. varied between 16% and 24% depending on the plants included and the time period. This is weighted by plant value added, so it is not driven a tiny amount of inputs flying to and from small plants. So inputs moved around, but not in a way that closed productivity gaps. Source: ASI-see Appendix A for sample construction details.
Reforms and productivity
We now ask: what caused the big increase in TFP in Indian manufacturing over our sample? The natural candidate is a series of industrial and trade policy reforms which began in the mid-1980s and intensified in the early 1990s. In Section 5.1 we provide details about these reforms and the mechanisms by which they might lift TFP either by promoting efficient input reallocation or within-plant productivity growth. In Section 5.2 we attempt to "explain" the productivity miracle, exploiting how the pace and timing of reforms varied across industries.
Industrial policy in India
After independence India adopted or continued industrial licensing, tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports, and restrictions on foreign direct investment. Later, a number of industries were "reserved" for small firms. Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), Sivadasan (2009), and Sharma (2008) provide details about the trade policy regime, the controls on FDI, and the license "raj", respectively. Panagariya (2008) provides a thorough review of the Indian growth experience and government policies. Below we provide a brief overview of some of the key policies and reforms affecting manufacturers.
The license raj refers to a system of controls on the entry of firms into the manufacturing sector commencing in 1956. Each and every plant that wanted to produce a manufactured good needed to receive permission (i.e., a license) from the central government. To receive a license, a plant had to satisfy certain conditions, including limits on output, imported raw materials, intermediate purchases, technology use, and the plant location.
11 The license regime arguably affected both the incentive and the ability of Indian plants to be productive. Complaints about the resulting high costs and low productivity in Indian manufacturing began building from the first decade of the licensing regime. But the first serious attempt to deregulate the system only came about in the 1980s. This was a piecemeal approach, in which a handful of industries were de-licensed in 1984, another handful in 1985 and so on. In 1991, the Indian economy faced a balance of payments crisis and received loans from the IMF and other international organizations. Under pressure from these organizations, the biggest de-licensing episode occurred. Almost all industrial licensing was removed-by 1994 all but 16% of manufacturing output had been de-licensed. Studies such as Sharma (2008) have linked de-licensing reforms to increases in the productivity of some plants, though there was no discernible impact at the industry level. De-licensing also appeared to raise the demand for skilled labor in Indian industry (Chamarbagwalla and Sharma, 2011) , and may have contributed to growth differences across regions (Aghion et al., 2005 (Aghion et al., , 2008 . We use the same de-licensing measures as Chamarbagwalla and Sharma (2011) and Sharma (2008) , updating for the years [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . A number of studies have analyzed the complicated web of tariff and non-tariff barriers that were used to restrict foreign trade in the hopes of paving the way for national self-sufficiency. As Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) describe, the regime consisted of high tariffs, a complex import licensing system, an "actual user" policy that restricted imports by intermediaries, restrictions of certain exports and imports to the public sector, phased manufacturing programs that mandated progressive import substitution, and government purchase preferences for domestic producers. There were some attempts to liberalize the system in the late 1980s. It was the 1991 balance of payments crisis, however, that led to major changes in both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers were rationalized and scaled down. According to Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), 26 import licensing lists were removed and one "negative" list was established in its place. Harrison et al. (2011) document that, between 1991 and 1997, the average final goods tariff rate on manufactured products fell from 95% to 35%, and tariff harmonization occurred as well. That is, industries with the highest pre-reform barriers faced deeper trade reforms.
The rationalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers continued into the late 1990s and early 2000s. Das (2003) , Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) and Harrison et al. (2011) analyze the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on productivity in Indian manufacturing. Using data on listed firms from 1987 to 2001, Topalova found that a 10% fall in tariffs lead to a 0.5% increase in TFP of the average firm. But Das did not find a positive impact of trade reforms on TFP at the industry level-in fact, he found productivity performance worsened as the pace of trade reform increased. In contrast, 11 As Panagariya (2008) and Sharma (2008) discuss in detail, the purpose of licensing was to direct capital into desirable industries. Every five years, the Planning Commission would issue demand projections for various sectors and commodities. The Ministry of Industry was then supposed to allocate capacity via the licensing system in a way that was consistent with these projections. This meant that some plants were output-constrained at some point in almost all industries. That is, they wished to produce more but they were not allowed to do so. Harrison et al. (2011) find all of their estimated average sectoral productivity growth can be explained by declining input tariffs. Harrison et al. (2011) are the main source of the tariff data we use in our analysis.
The third aspect of the industrial policy regime in India from 1970s onwards was control of foreign direct investment. As Sivadasan (2009) documents, prior to 1991 foreign ownership rates were restricted to 40% in most industries. Further restrictions were placed on the use of foreign brand names, remittances of dividends abroad, and imported content in output. After the 1991 balance of payments crisis, foreign ownership rates of up to 51% were allowed for a group of industries and the restrictions on brands, remittances and imported content were relaxed. Sivadasan (2009) estimates that this FDI liberalization boosted mean industry-level productivity by 22%, and that tariff liberalization boosted productivity by 59% (in the 1994-1995 period compared to the pre-reform 1987-1990 period). He found within-plant productivity gains were the single largest contributor, boosting TFP 25% in FDI-liberalized industries and 55% in tariff-liberalized industries. Intra-industry reallocation played a smaller role in the productivity gains he estimates. Sivadasan (2009) is the source of FDI liberalization data we use in our analysis.
The fourth and final Indian policy we analyze is the promotion of small-scale industry (SSI). In 1967 the government began a policy of reserving the manufacture of certain products exclusively for small producers (a plant was defined as "small" if its capital stock was under a certain threshold). Once a product was placed on the SSI list, no new medium or large enterprises were allowed to enter, and the production capacity of existing medium and large enterprises was capped. Panagariya (2008) points out that the bulk of SSI items were labor-intensive products, in which India presumably had a comparative advantage. SSI reservations may have kept India out of the world market for these products, and may have reduced the incentive of SSI plants to produce high-quality products. The SSI list began with 47 items but steadily expanded until tens of thousands of products were reserved. The market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s did not do much to dismantle this reservation. It was not until the early part of the twenty-first century that de-reservation of industries began in earnest.
Policy regressions
Each of the industrial and trade policy reforms that took place during the 1980s and 1990s had the potential to boost aggregate productivity. De-licensing could have given productive plants greater leeway to raise their market share. Further, de-licensing may have induced plants to invest more in raising their productivity, as they could more easily scale up production if they became more productive. Trade and FDI reforms could have increased aggregate productivity through a number of channels. Examples include reallocation as in Melitz (2003) , endogenous innovation of incumbents as in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) , and increased availability of high quality imported inputs as in Goldberg et al. (2010a) . More controversially, the presence of FDI on Indian soil may have generated productivity spillovers from foreign-owned plants to competing domestic plants or to vertically related Indian suppliers/buyers. De-reservation of SSI industries could have reaped scale economies, reallocated inputs from less to more efficient plants, and promoted innovation.
While reforms were concentrated in the late 1980s or early 1990s, there was substantial variation in the intensity and timing of reforms enacted across industries. Table A.7 shows significant cross-sectional variation in de-licensing during the 1980s, in FDI liberalization during the 1990s, and in trade reforms and de-reservation during the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, Table A .8 shows that industries differed a lot in their productivity growth rates from 1980-2007. Whereas TFP in the median three-digit industry grew 4.5 percent per year, the standard deviation is around 7 percentage points per year, and the inter-quartile range is about 6 percentage points per year. Did those industries experiencing bigger reforms exhibit higher TFP after the reforms hit them?
With this motivation in mind, we regress the log level of industry productivity (TFP) on five policy measures, controlling for both year and industry fixed effects. We run these regressions on levels with the idea that reforms may have had permanent effects on the level of productivity, but not its growth rate. De-licensing of the textile industry in 1991, for example, might show up in higher TFP levels in the textile industry in 1991 onwards (relative to other industries in those years and relative to the norm for that industry). The policies are measured as the fraction of industry output licensed (which lies between 0 and 1), the tariff rate (a 100% tariff corresponding to 1), the fraction of the industry open to FDI (between 0 and 1), the fraction of the industry not subject to SSI reservations (again, between 0 and 1), and the input tariff rate (weighted average nominal tariffs on sectors that supply inputs, where the weights are input-output coefficients).
We collect these results in an Online Appendix. In most cases the reforms do not have a statistically significant relation to industry productivity or its components (plant efficiency, reallocation, etc.). There are some notable exceptions where the effects seem large both economically and statistically. For example, fully opening an industry to FDI is associated with 14-32 percentage points higher sectoral TFP, with standard errors sometimes less than 10 percentage points. This is mostly via growth in existing plant efficiency. Freeing up a fully reserved industry, meanwhile, seems to lower sectoral TFP by inducing high productivity industries to shed inputs. That is, inputs move from high to low productivity sectors as dereservation occurs.
12 Finally, lowering input tariffs goes along with 14-34 percentage points higher sectoral productivity (standard errors of 8-15 percentage points), predominantly through higher plant efficiency.
We further regress industry log productivity levels on all five reform variables simultaneously rather than one by one. Multi-collinearity is obviously a potential pitfall, especially given several reforms took place around 1991 in many industries. Still, statistical significance continues to hold for FDI liberalization (associated with higher plant efficiency), de-reservation (associated with worse allocative efficiency across sectors), and input tariff reductions (higher plant efficiency).
Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The standard errors are sizable (tens of percentage points). We often cannot reject the hypothesis of substantial benefits of a reform through a number of channels. We therefore set aside the issue of statistical significance, and calculate the effects of policy changes between 1980 and 2007 (between 1985 and 2007 for tariffs) implied by the point estimates in our policy regressions. This presumes causality. As a robustness check, we also consider the impact implied by the coefficients plus one standard error. This seems quite generous, probability wise, in that we do this for all of the coefficients at once. Table 10 reports these calculations. For example, opening up 37% of output to FDI between 1980 and 2007 was arguably responsible for an 8 percentage point increase in aggregate TFP over that period. If we add up the estimated effects of all the policy changes together, in this fashion, the point estimate is a cumulative 13 or 19 percentage point boost to aggregate TFP, depending on whether we look at the L 200 or Census panel. If we simultaneously add one standard error to each of the policy effects, the combined boost is more substantial at 28% (Census panel) or 40% (L 200 panel). Such productivity benefits are in line with previous studies of individual reforms.
As Fig. 7 shows, the context is around 165% points of cumulative TFP growth from 1980 to 2007 (160% in the Census panel and 170% in the L 200 panel). The point estimates from the regressions in Table 10 therefore attribute less than one-fifth of cumulative TFP growth between 1980 and 2007 to policy reforms. Essentially none of this is through allocative efficiency. If we add one standard error to all coefficients, the share of TFP growth explained rises to about one-third. Still, most of India's manufacturing miracle appears remains mysterious. Now, reformed industries could have had lower productivity growth to begin with. But we obtain similar results when we change the dependent variable from industry-year productivity levels to growth rates. Industry productivity trends apart from the reforms should be absorbed in the industry fixed effects when the dependent variable is industry productivity growth.
Another possibility is policy reforms do not affect industry productivity immediately, but rather with a lag. In additional robustness tests we allow policies from the last three or five years to affect productivity. For example, we measure tariff policy in 1993 as the average tariff in 1993 , 1992 and 1991 show that the contribution of reforms to cumulative TFP growth rises to 20-39% when we allow for 3 year lags, and to 29-50% when we allow for 5 year lags. Thus, allowing for longer windows more than doubles the explanatory power of de-licensing, FDI and tariff liberalization, and de-reservation. Still, the point estimates leave most growth unexplained.
An important caveat is that, for our full 1980-2007 sample, we have only 2-digit industry deflators. It is possible that 3-digit reforms raise productivity at the 3-digit level, but also lower the 3-digit deflator. Having policy measures more disaggregated (3-digit) than our industry deflators (2-digit) could be attenuating our estimated policy effects. To gauge the potential importance of this bias, we estimate policy effects on the 1980-1994 sub-sample for which we have 3-digit deflators. The results are little affected: the contribution of policy continues to be small relative to cumulative productivity growth.
We think it is appropriate to end this section with a recap of caveats to our analysis:
• Empirical proxies for reforms are crude and incomplete. Enforcement may differ across industries and time.
• Reforms might not be implemented randomly with respect to an industry's productivity prospects. Struggling industries might be targeted or shielded.
• Measurement of real output and inputs is far from perfect. Plants may cease to under-report output or inputs after de-licensing. Quality and variety are notoriously difficult to measure (but see Goldberg et al., 2010a Goldberg et al., , 2010b , for efforts on the input and output side for India).
• General equilibrium forces can exaggerate or hide the gains when looking at the industry level. Skilled workers might move in or out of reformed industries, thereby affecting TFP in reformed industries more than aggregate TFP. Industries with rapid TFP growth may see declining relative prices, making it crucial to pick these up in industry deflators.
• Forward-looking behavior can mute or amplify gains around the years when an industry is reformed. Firms might undertake investments in intangible capital in anticipation of future reforms (or even at the height of reforms), with the TFP benefits not showing up until later. See Costantini and Melitz (2010) .
• Growth in other sectors-say in human capital per worker or the service sector-may have fueled manufacturing's success. The wave of reforms may have triggered investments in skills or technology well in advance of their implementation in specific industries, with benefits reaped well afterward.
• Earlier policies protecting the manufacturing sector may have laid the groundwork by building a manufacturing base primed for a miracle.
• Our analysis covers only large formal manufacturing plants, to the exclusion of smaller and informal plants, as well as the non-manufacturing sectors (agriculture, services). . Average sectoral productivity, and estimated policy contribution. "Estimated policy effect" plots the sum of cumulative aggregate changes in each policy multiplied by the effect estimated by regressing log levels of industry TFP on individual policy measures, controlling for both year and industry effects and with weight correction for both plant and sector noise. "Estimated policy-effect + 1 S.E." does the same, except it takes as it's "effect" the point estimate plus one standard error. Series re-initiated in 1997 at 1994 levels due to missing 1995 and 1996 data. All aggregate policy averages are weighted by the same annual value added shares used to aggregate productivity Table 10 due to missing 1994-1997. It is clear from these caveats that looking at the industry-year level could easily overstate or understate the productivity effects of reforms.
Conclusion
Using the Annual Survey of Industries, we document a substantial speedup in manufacturing TFP growth in India: our point estimate is over 5 percentage points per year for 1993-2007 vs. 1980-1992. This estimate is imprecise, as the standard errors are 2.5 to 3 percentage points, depending on the exact correction for heteroscedasticity. Almost all of this pickup arises from changes in plant efficiency over time, as opposed to reallocation of inputs across plants.
As this rapid TFP growth occurred amidst a number of policy reforms in India, a natural question is whether reforms produced the manufacturing miracle. The truth may well be yes, but we could not confirm it. Those industries experiencing more liberalization (of licensing, tariffs, FDI, and size reservations) do not display sufficiently faster TFP growth to account for most of the miracle. Even if we raise all our policy impact estimates by one standard error at once, or consider several year lags for policy effects on productivity, these reforms account for less than one-third of cumulative TFP growth from 1980-2007, and none of the speedup. 1980-1981 to 1986-1987 100 or more workers 50 or more workers with power All plants in 12 industrially backward states 1987-1988 to 1996-1997 100 or more workers (with or without power) All plants in (same) 12 industrially backward states 1997-1998 to 2003-2004 200 or more workers Selected "Significant units" with fewer than 200 workers which "contributed significantly to the value of output" in ASI data between 1993-1994 and 1995-1996 All plants in (same) 12 industrially backward states All public sector undertakings [2004] [2005] 100 or more workers All plants in 5 industrially backward states
It is possible that liberalization made the miracle happen, but not in ways seen in measured growth at the industry level using our incomplete and imperfect reform indicators. This is our presumption. Our hope is that additional evidence on policies and productivity will clarify the role played by liberalization, which we very much presume to be positive.
Appendix A
A.1. ASI plant-level data
The ASI sampling population is all factories registered under Sections 2m(i) or 2m(ii) of the 1948 Factories Act: factories using power employing 10 or more (permanent, production) workers, and factories without power employing 20 or more workers. The Chief Inspector of Factories in each state maintains a list of registered factories, from which the ASI sampling frame is drawn.
All plants employing more than a threshold number of workers, along with plants in certain other categories, are surveyed each year-we call this the "Census sample". Smaller plants are sampled randomly. Table A .1 outlines how the Census sample criteria changed over the period of our data. An observation is single plant for the fiscal year from April to March, with the exception that an owner of two or more establishments located in the same state, industry group and survey division (i.e., Census sample or not) is permitted to submit a single consolidated return.
In Fig. A.1 we show the distribution of employment across all ASI plants and across plants in the Census sub-sample in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2007 . The distributions are quite similar across the samples and over time, move rightwards. Note that there exist Census sector plants with far fewer than 50 workers due to the fact that all plants in certain industrially backward areas needed to be sampled (see Table A .1) . Table A .2 shows the evolution of employment and real output across all three samples of the data and Table A .3 shows the distribution of employment across 2-digit industries and years.
A.2. Plant matching algorithm
The lack of plant identifiers in the ASI data is an econometric challenge. Fortunately, we know that data on plants in the Census sub-sample of the ASI are collected each year. Further the ASI data provide information on both time invariant plant characteristics-for e.g., year of initial production, state in which the plant is located, industry of operation etc.-as well as on opening and closing stocks of several accounting variables.
To link up annual plant observations into a panel, we algorithmically link up observations (in the Census sub-sample) in adjacent years pair-by-pair. To be matched, any two observations must be in the same state-by-industry cell (using 1975 state boundaries). Within each cell, we then attempt to find unique matches on the eight variables (which are reported on a consistent basis in every year from 1980-1994 and 1997-2007) . There are two plant characteristics which we expect to remain constant over time: the year of initial production, and four plant ownership categories. We take one match variable as the interaction of these. (No other static plant characteristics are reported using the same definition in every year.) There are also six variables for which opening and closing values are available in every year: fixed assets, working capital, raw materials, outstanding loans, finished goods and semi-finished goods. We try to match closing values to the opening values in the next year, rounded initially to six significant figures. Zero or missing values are not used in the matching algorithm. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
• For each year-to-year transition, within each state-by-industry cell, try to match observations which match uniquely on all seven matching variables.
• For the remaining unmatched observations, drop one matching variable at a time, starting with the variable with the most missing or zero values, and attempt to uniquely match on six matching variables.
• Iteratively continue, dropping more variables (in the same order). The minimum number of variables that are required to match (henceforth referred to as MV) is an important tuning parameter.
• Next, round all opening/closing variables to one fewer significant figure, and repeat the above. The minimum number of significant figures on each variable (henceforth referred to as SF) is the second important tuning parameter in the algorithm.
An additional complication arises due to the gap year 1995-1996 (when the survey was not conducted). We are unable to link plants with panel identifiers generated using the algorithm in 1994-1995 with those in 1996-1997 . So the set of panel ids before 1994 do not carry over to observations after 1997. One interpretation of our strategy is that plants born in 1980 die in 1994 and then plants are reborn in 1997 with different identifiers. This inability to match the plants before and after the gap is exactly why we are missing the growth rates in 1995 and 1996 in all figures.
All analysis in this paper are based on plant data that are matched based on 3 variables (within the state-industry cell)
and on a minimum of 2 significant figures. That is, MV = 3 and SF = 2. Below we explain our choice of tuning parameters. The table is constructed using ASI plants that were operating in each fiscal year and had positive factors of production and output. Recently, the ASI has released plant-level data with plant identifiers for the years 1998-2007. This provides us with the unique opportunity of testing the quality of our matching algorithm. Tables A.4-A.6 show the Type I errors (i.e. real matches not identified by the algorithm) and Type II errors (of all pseudo-panel matches, those that are false positives) as well as the total number of matches. These tables guided our choice of MV = 3 and SF = 2 as tuning parameters. From these tables some important observations about our panel algorithm can be made.
• Even with the most lax criteria, a substantial number of matches are missed (e.g. Pr(Type I error) = 35%), which is trouble for the accounting of entry and exit using the pseudo panel.
• Due to data error (e.g., in the panel identified data there are instances of 'initial year' being misreported) no algorithm could attain 0% Type I errors.
• As expected, the criterion (MV = 2, SF = 1) incurs a high rate of false positives, but outside of the criteria (2, 1, 2, 2 and 3, 1) variation in the false positive match rate is under 1.3 percentage points.
• Using the strictest criteria (MV = 7, SF = 6), the loss in terms of correct matches foregone is high (only 4100 matches made).
• Although we presume that the cost of a false positive match is higher than the cost of a false negative for our analysis, the marginal rate of transformation would seem to justify relaxing criteria to some extent: with (MV = 3, SF = 3), the false positive rate increases by 1 percentage point relative to (MV = 7, SF = 6), but 36,000 matches are obtained versus 4100 (while false positives increase from 160 to 1800). Similarly, the criterion of (MV = 3, SF = 2) seems to us "better" than (MV = 3, SF = 3). 
A.3. Other data sources and methodology
All deflators come from the Reserve Bank of India's Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy. We use 2-digit output deflators together with a primary-sector deflator to construct industry-specific material deflators. To do this, we develop a concordance between our industry codes and the ASICC product codes reported for major inputs and outputs of each plant from 1996-1997 onwards, and then use the information on the value of input products to construct input-output tables. For each industry-pair we take the median input-output share for these years, and then use this information together with the manufacturing output deflators and a deflator for non-manufacturing primary-sector output to construct an industry-specific materials deflator as a weighted average.
Total compensation-including benefits, bonuses and any in-kind payments-is only reported for all employees, and so we assign all non-wage compensation between skilled and unskilled workers in proportion to the plant's wage payments to each of these groups. Fixed assets growth is calculated from the difference between opening and closing balance-sheet values. Policy coefficients were estimated by regressing log levels of industry TFP on individual policy measures, controlling for both year and industry effects and with weight correction for both plant and sector noise. "All policies" coefficients were estimated by regression log levels of TFP on all five policy measures simultaneously. Policy coefficients were estimated by regressing log levels of industry TFP on individual policy measures, controlling for both year and industry effects and with weight correction for both plant and sector noise. "All policies" coefficients were estimated by regression log levels of TFP on all five policy measures simultaneously. 
A.4. Supplementary tables
